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1Security Enhancement for NOMA-UAV Networks 
Abstract—Owing to its distinctive merits, non-orthogonal mul-
tiple access (NOMA) techniques have been utilized in unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) enabled wireless base stations to provide
effective coverage for terrestrial users. However, the security
of NOMA-UAV systems remains a challenge due to the line-of-
sight air-to-ground channels and higher transmission power of
weaker users in NOMA. In this paper, we propose two schemes
to guarantee the secure transmission in UAV-NOMA networks.
When only one user requires secure transmission, we derive
the hovering position for the UAV and the power allocation to
meet rate threshold of the secure user while maximizing the sum
rate of remaining users. This disrupts the eavesdropping towards
the secure user effectively. When multiple users require secure
transmission, we further take the advantage of beamforming
via multiple antennas at the UAV to guarantee their secure
transmission. Due to the non-convexity of this problem, we
convert it into a convex one for an iterative solution by using the
second order cone programming. Finally, simulation results are
provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Beamforming optimization, non-orthogonal
multiple access, physical layer security, power allocation, un-
manned aerial vehicle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could be used as a
platform to provide cost-effective wireless communications
for terrestrial users [2]–[4]. Under these solutions, the un-
obstructed air-to-ground channels can be modeled as high-
quality line-of-sight (LoS) links [5]. Meanwhile, due to their
flexibility and mobility, UAV-based transmitters have a wider
wireless coverage in both urban and rural areas [6], [7]. Thus,
recent research advances have made it possible to improve the
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performance of UAV networks significantly [8]–[16]. In [8],
Zeng et al. exploited a mobile relay mounted on the UAV to
maximize the network throughput via optimizing the transmit
power and the trajectory of the UAV relay. A novel sense-and-
send scheme for cooperative UAVs was designed by Zhang et
al. to enable the UAV-to-X transmission in [9], with the sub-
channel allocation and the UAV speed jointly optimized to
maximize the sum rate. In [10], Fan et al. proposed a UAV
relaying network, in which the transmit power, bandwidth, rate
and the location of the UAV were jointly optimized to max-
imize the network throughput. The transceiver was designed
and the multihop device-to-device links were established by
Liu et al. in [11], to guarantee the reliable transmission with
extended coverage in disasters. In [12], Zhang et al. optimized
the trajectory of UAV to minimize its mission completion time
in cellular-connected UAV networks. Zeng et al. proposed an
effective algorithm to jointly optimize the hovering locations,
durations and flying trajectory in [13], to minimize the energy
consumption of the UAVs. In [14], Zhang et al. proposed an
effective scheme to minimize the energy consumption in UAV-
assisted mobile edge computing systems. In [15], Yang et al.
made a fundamental energy tradeoff in UAV wireless networks
by considering both the circular and straight trajectories. Tang
et al. proposed a channel assignment algorithm in the wireless
network combining both UAV and D2D [16]. However, the
high-quality LoS links make the information easily to be
eavesdropped in UAV communications [17]–[20]. In [18],
the trajectory and scheduling were jointly optimized in a
dual-UAV network by Cai et al., to guarantee the secure
transmission for ground users effectively. In [19], the secure
transmission of the UAV relaying system was ensured by
Cheng et al. via the edge caching and trajectory optimiza-
tion. Xiao et al. maximized the secrecy energy efficiency of
the UAV relay with the uncertain location of eavesdropper
considered in [20].
On the other hand, non-orthogonal multiple access (NO-
MA) is becoming an important technique for future wireless
networks, due to its low latency, high reliability, massive
connectivity and high throughput [21]–[23]. In the power-
domain NOMA scheme, the base station (BS) performs power
allocation (PA) according to the quality of channels [24].
Then, the high-power signals from other NOMA users can be
decoded and removed by successive interference cancellation
(SIC) at each user before decoding its own. Due to its
superior performance, NOMA has received great attention
in both academia and industry [25]–[28]. In [25], Cui et
al. proposed a PA scheme for downlink NOMA networks
under outage constraints with a single antenna at the BS.
The performance of capacity and sum rate in NOMA relaying
systems with massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
2was analyzed by Zhang et al. in [26]. In [27], the PA and
time switching control were jointly optimized by Tang et
al. to effectively maximize the energy efficiency in NOMA
networks with simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer. Two effective relay selection schemes for cooperative
downlink NOMA networks were proposed by Xu et al. in
[28]. However, the security in NOMA networks is greatly
threatened due to the higher transmit power for the weaker
users, which makes the information for these users easy to be
eavesdropped [29]. Some preliminary works have been done
to improve the security of NOMA [30]–[32]. In [30], Li et
al. optimized the PA and beamforming to maximize the sum
secrecy rate of central users in downlink multiple-input single-
output (MISO) NOMA networks. The privacy of a specific
user was guaranteed by Cao et al. via joint beamforming
optimization at the BS to prevent eavesdropping inside the
NOMA network [31]. In [32], Zheng et al. proposed to exploit
the artificial noise and full duplex relay to ensure the secure
transmission for NOMA networks with two-way relaying in
the presence of eavesdroppers. In [33], artificial jamming
was generated together with the NOMA information by the
BS via beamforming optimization to disrupt the adversarial
eavesdropping without affecting the legitimate transmission.
To leverage the advantages of both techniques, UAV and
NOMA have been combined [34]–[38]. In [34], some fun-
damental work was done by Liu et al. to establish a novel
framework of UAV communications based on NOMA. In
[35], Liu et al. proposed a multi-objective resource allocation
scheme in UAV-assisted networks for disasters. A novel UAV-
aided NOMA scheme was proposed by Hou et al. in [36] to
provide wireless transmission for ground users. In [37], Zhao
et al. proposed a UAV-aided NOMA scheme, and the sum
rate can be maximized by jointly optimizing the precoding of
NOMA at BS and the UAV trajectory. NOMA was applied to
cellular-connected UAV networks by Mei and Zhang in [38],
to avoid severe uplink interference from the UAV to cellular
BSs. Nevertheless, the security of NOMA-UAV networks is
largely ignored in the existing works. Thus, in this paper, we
propose two schemes to enhance the security of NOMA-UAV
networks via PA and beamforming optimization, respectively.
The main motivations and contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows.
 In NOMA-UAV wireless networks, the security remains
as a challenging issue, due to the LoS air-to-ground links
and higher transmit power of weaker users in NOMA.
To the best of our knowledge, this important aspect has
been largely ignored in existing research. Thus, in this
paper, we propose two schemes via PA and beamforming
to improve the performance of secure transmission for
NOMA-UAV networks.
 First, we assume that one of the ground users requires
secure transmission from the single-antenna UAV. The
optimal location of the UAV is derived and the optimal
PA among users is performed at the UAV to guarantee
the security of the private user. The PA optimization
problem is converted into convex ones, and its closed-
form solution is derived.
Fig. 1. A NOMA-UAV network with one secure user, several common users
and one eavesdropper.
 Then, we consider the case when multiple users require
secure transmission simultaneously. We fully exploit the
antenna resource at the UAV, and perform beamforming
optimization to guarantee the secure transmission for
these users in NOMA-UAV networks. The problem is
non-convex, and we use the first-order Taylor expansion
to transform it into a second-order cone programming
(SOCP) problem, which can be solved by iteratively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model is presented. The secure transmission
scheme for single-antenna NOMA-UAV networks is proposed
in Section III. In Section IV, the beamforming optimization
at the UAV for multiple secure users is studied. Simulation
results are discussed in Section V, followed by the conclusion
in Section VI.
Notation: khk and hy denote the Euclidean norm and Her-
mitian transpose of h. CMN is the space of MN complex
matrices. CN (h;H) is the complex Gaussian distribution with
mean h and covariance H. Re(a) represents the real part of a
complex number a.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the downlink transmission in a NOMA wireless
network as shown in Fig. 1, where a UAV serves K single-
antenna ground users. There exists a ground eavesdropper
aiming to intercept the private information of a specific user.
Denote the ith user as Ui, i = 1; :::;K. Us is assumed to
be the secure user that requires privacy from the UAV, while
the other users only require the public information. Define
di as the distance between the UAV and Ui. Without loss of
generality, we assume that
d1  d2  :::  dK : (1)
NOMA is adopted to send the superimposed information to the
K users. The transmitted signal by the UAV can be expressed
as
x =
KX
i=1
p
pisi; (2)
3where pi represents the transmit power of Ui, satisfying
KX
i=1
pi = Psum; (3)
and si is the information for Ui with E
jsij2	 = 1. The
received signal at Ui can be expressed as
yi = hi
p
pisi +
KX
j=1;j 6=i
hi
p
pjsj + ni; (4)
where hi =
q
d i represents the channel coefficient from
the UAV to Ui in LoS, ni  CN (0; 2i ) is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Ui with zero mean and variance
2i ,  is a parameter of channel gain at the reference distance
d0 = 1 m, and di is the distance between the UAV and Ui.
 is the path-loss exponent, which is equal to 2 due to the
air-to-ground LoS channels.
According to NOMA, the decoding order is related to the
distance, i.e., the information of farther users from the UAV
should be first decoded. Before decoding the message of
Us, we adopt SIC to decode and eliminate the information
from Us+1 to UK , and the received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise-ratio (SINR) at Us can be denoted as
SINRss =
h2sps
h2s
s 1P
m=1
pm + 2
: (5)
Thus, the transmission rate of Us can be written as
Rst = log2 (1 + SINR
s
s): (6)
The eavesdropping SINR towards Us at the eavesdropper
can be expressed as
SINRse =
h2eps
h2e
KP
i=1;i6=s
pi + 2
; (7)
where he indicates the channel power gain between the UAV
and the eavesdropper. Thus, the eavesdropping rate can be
denoted as
Rse = log2 (1 + SINR
s
e) : (8)
Accordingly, the secrecy rate of Uj can be given by
Rss = (R
s
t  Rse)+ ; (9)
where (:)+ means that if Rst > R
s
e, R
s
s = R
s
t  Rse, otherwise,
Rss = 0.
From (7) and (9), we can conclude that when Us is far away
from the UAV, its transmit power is quite high and it is easy to
be eavesdropped. Therefore, a PA scheme is proposed in the
next section to guarantee the secure transmission of Us while
satisfying the QoS requirements of other users.
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR SINGLE-ANTENNA
NOMA-UAV NETWORKS
In this section, the hovering position of UAV is discussed
and the PA is optimized to guarantee the security for the secure
user. Then, the case of two secure users in the network is
briefly discussed.
A. A Single Secure User
According to NOMA, farther users from the UAV will be
allocated with higher transmit power, and hence their security
is in danger. Thus, the UAV should just hover above the secure
user to minimize its transmit power when there is only one
user requires private transmission.
Proposition 1: In order to minimize the transmit power for
the secure user Us, the UAV should hover above it.
Proof: According to (7), in order to minimize the eaves-
dropping SINR towards Us, ps should be minimized andPK
i=1;i6=s pi should be maximized. According to NOMA, Us
should be nearer from the UAV than other users. Thus, in
this case, the secure user can be defined as U1, i.e., U1 , Us.
Assume that the horizontal position of the UAV is Q0(x0; y0),
and the location of U1 is W1(x1; y1). Hence, the channel
coefficient between them can be denoted as
h1 =
r

H2 + kQ0  W1k2
; (10)
where H represents the height of UAV. Accordingly, the
transmission rate of U1 can be expressed as
R1 = log2

1 +
h21p1
2

 r1; (11)
where r1 is the threshold of achievable rate. From (11), we
have
p1  (2
r1   1)2
h21
: (12)
Obviously, p1 can achieve the minimum value when h21 is
maximum. In this case, according to (10), the denominator
should take the minimum value, i.e., Q0 = W1. Hence, it can
be concluded that the UAV should hover above U1 to minimize
its transmit power.
Thus, we assume that U1 is the secure user with (13) and
(14) limited to
PK
i=1 pi = Psum.
h1  h2  :::  hK : (13)
0  p1  p2  :::  pK : (14)
To maximize the sum rate of other users while guaranteeing
the secure transmission of U1, the optimization problem can
be formulated as
max
p2;p3;:::;pK
KX
i=2
Ri (15a)
s:t: Ri  ri; i = 1; :::;K; (15b)
0  p1  p2  :::  pK ; (15c)
KX
i=1
pi = Psum; (15d)
with p1 =
(2r1 1)2
h21
.
To determine whether (15) is convex, we first define i as
i =
h2i
2
; (16)
4and Ri can be transformed into
Ri = log2
 
1 +
h2i pi
jhij2
Pi 1
j=1 pj + 
2
!
= log2
 
1 +
ipi
i
Pi 1
j=1 pj + 1
!
:
(17)
Then, we define
qi =
iX
j=1
pi; i = 1; 2; :::;K; (18)
qK = Psum: (19)
It can be derived that
pi = qi   qi 1; i = 2; :::;K; (20)
and (17) can be further written as
Ri = log2

1 +
i(qi   qi 1)
iqi 1 + 1

= log2

1 + iqi
1 + iqi 1

= log2 (1 + iqi)  log2(1 + iqi 1) :
(21)
Thus, the condition (15b) can be changed into
Ri = log2
1 + iqi
1 + iqi 1
 ri; (22)
) 1 + iqi
1 + iqi 1
 2ri = 1
i
; (23)
) i + iiqi  1 + iqi 1; (24)
) qi 1  i   1
i
+ iqi; (25)
) qi 1  iqi   i; (26)
for i = 2; :::;K, where i and i satisfy
i = 2
 ri ; (27)
i =
1  i
i
: (28)
Similarly, 0  p1  p2  :::  pK is equivalent to q2   q1 
q3   q2  :::  qK   qK 1.
Define f1(q1) and fi(qi) as
f1(q1) = log2(1 + 1q1); i = 1; (29)
fi(qi) = log2
1 + iqi
1 + i 1qi
; i = 2; :::;K; (30)
and the sum rate of common users can be expressed as
KX
i=2
Ri =
KX
i=2
fi(qi): (31)
Thus, the problem (15) can be changed into
max
qi
KX
i=2
fi(qi)
s:t: qi 1  iqi   i; i = 2; :::;K   1;
q2   q1  q3   q2  :::  qK   qK 1;
q1 = p1;
qK = Psum:
(32)
Lemma 1: The problem (32) is convex.
Proof: The first-order derivative of fi(qi), for i =
1; :::;K, can be expressed as
f 0i(qi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
ln 2

1
1
+ q1
 ; i = 1;
1
i 1
  11
ln 2

1
i
+ qi

1
i 1
+ qi
 ; i=2; :::;K: (33)
Since i  i 1  0 and qi  0, we have f 0i(qi)  0, for
i = 1; 2; :::;K.
The second-order derivative of fi(qi) can be derived as
f 00i (qi)=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
  1
ln 2

1
1
+ q1
2 ; i = 1;

1
i
+ qi
2
 

1
i 1 + qi
2
ln 2

1
i 1 + qi
2 
1
i
+qi
2 ; i =2; :::;K:
(34)
Obviously, we have f 00i (qi)  0. As a result, all the conditions
in (32) are linear. Thus, the problem (32) is convex.
Based on Lemma 1, we can derive the solution to the PA
problem in (32) by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: The solution to (15) can be obtained as
p^i =
8><>:
p1; i =1;
(1  i)q^i + i; i =2; :::;K   1;
Psum   p1   :::  pK 1; i =K:
(35)
Proof: According to (26), when i = 2; :::;K   1, we can
conclude that
qi  i+1q^i+1   i+1; i = 2; :::;K   1: (36)
By means of (18), when i = 1, we have q1 = p1. Similarly,
when i = K, qK = Psum. As a result, we can obtain the
solution to (32) as
q^i =
8><>:
p1; i =1;
i+1q^i+1   i+1; i =2; :::;K   1;
Psum; i =K:
(37)
Due to pi = qi   qi 1, the solution to (15) can be expressed
as (35).
Based on (35), the transmission rate of U1 can be calculated
as
R1t = log2
 
1 + SINR11

= log2

1 +
h21p1
2

: (38)
Assume that the position of eavesdropper is Ee(xe; ye), and
the eavesdropping channel can be expressed as he =
p
d e ,
where de is the distance between the UAV and eavesdropper.
We have the channel coefficient from the UAV to the eaves-
dropper as
he =
0p
H2 + kQ0   Eek2
: (39)
5Thus, the eavesdropping SINR towards the secure user U1 can
be expressed as
SINR1e =
h2ep1
h2e
KP
i=2
pi + 2
: (40)
Accordingly, we can derive the eavesdropping rate towards U1
as
R1e = log2
 
1 +
h2ep1
h2e
PK
i=2 pi + 
2
!
: (41)
Based on (38) and (41), we can obtain the secrecy rate of U1
as
R1s = R
1
t  R1e
= log2

1+
h21p1
2

 log2
 
1+
h2ep1
h2e
PK
i=2 pi + 
2
!
:
(42)
Remark 1: From (41), we can conclude that R1e is close to
0, because p2; :::; pK are much higher than p1. In other words,
the signal of U1 can be hidden in the high-power signals of
other users to guarantee its secure transmission.
B. Two Secure Users
We assume that two users, Um and Un, both require
secure transmission, with their coordinates as Wm(xm; ym)
and Wn(xn; yn). Um has a higher secure priority than Un.
Without loss of generality, we assume
d1 < ::: < dm < ::: < dn < ::: < dK : (43)
To guarantee the secure transmission, the eavesdropping rate
towards them should be as low as possible. Thus, we should
maximize the sum rate of other common users while guaran-
teeing the QoS requirements of secure users. The problem can
be expressed as
max
p1;p2;:::pK
KX
i=1;i 6=m;i6=n
Ri
s:t: Ri  ri; i = 1; :::;K;
0 <p1<; :::; <pm<; :::; <pn<; :::; <pK ;
KX
i=1
pi = Psum:
(44)
When the secure users Um and Un are close to each other
compared with common users, e.g., Um = U1, Un = U2, (44)
can be solved in the same way as (15). The transmission rate
of U1 and U2 can be expressed as
R1 = log2

1 +
h21p1
2

 r1;
R2 = log2

1 +
h22p2
h22p1 + 
2

 r2:
(45)
Thus, p1 and p2 can be calculated as
p1 =
(2r1   1)2
h21
;
p2 =
(2r2   1)(h22p1 + 2)
h22
:
(46)
Accordingly, the solution to (44) is similar to (15), and we
have
pi =
8><>:
p1; i =1;
p2; i =2;
(1  i)qi + i; i =3; :::;K:
(47)
However, when U1 and U2 are not next to each other, it is
difficult to satisfy
max(d1; d2) < max(d3; :::; dK); (48)
no matter where the UAV hovers. Thus, (44) has no solution
in this case.
In addition, if there are more than three secure users, it
becomes even more difficult to solve (44) with a single antenna
at the UAV. Thus, we will solve the secure transmission
problem with several secure users by exploiting multiple
antennas at the UAV in the following section.
IV. BEAMFORMING OPTIMIZATION FOR MULTIPLE
SECURE USERS
In this section, we take advantage of multiple antennas at
UAV via beamforming to improve the secure performance
of these users, where a UAV with M antennas transmits
information to K single-antenna users.
A. Problem Formulation
We assume that there exist S secure users, i.e., U1; :::; US ,
and US+1; :::; UK are common ones. Without loss of general-
ity, we define the distance for the secure users as
d1  d2  :::  dS ; (49)
and the distance for the common users as
dS+1  dS+2  :::  dK : (50)
The security priority is U1 > U2 > ::: > US .
The transmitted signal by the UAV can be expressed as
x =
KX
i=1
visi; (51)
where vi 2 CM1 is the precoding vector for Ui, with kvik2 =
pi; i = 1; :::;K:
Thus, the received signal at Ui can be denoted as
yi = hyivisi +
KX
j 6=i
hyivjsi + ni; i = 1; :::;K; (52)
where hi =
q
d i gi 2 CM1 is the channel gain vector
from the UAV to Ui, and gi  CN (0; I) represents the
corresponding Rayleigh fading vector. The channel vector
from the UAV to the eavesdropper can be expressed as
he =
r

H2 + kQ  Ek2 ge; (53)
where ge  CN (0; I) is the corresponding Rayleigh fading
vector from the UAV to the eavesdropper.
6Due to the existence of S secure users, the decoding order
should be expressed as K !    ! S !    ! 2 ! 1.
Accordingly, the PA constraints should follow8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
hy1v12  hy1v22 :::  hy1vS2 :::  hy1vK2 ;
::::::hySv12  hySv22 :::  hySvS2 :::  hySvK2 ;hyS+1v12 hyS+1v22 ::: hyS+1vS2::: hyS+1vK2;
::::::hyKv12  hyKv22 :::  hyKvS2 :::  hyKvK2 ;
(54)
which is beneficial to improve the SINR and fulfill the desired
decoding order at NOMA users.
Thus, according to NOMA, the achievable SINR to decode
the signal for Ui at Uj can be denoted as
SINRij =
hyjvi2
i 1P
m=1
hyjvm2 + 2 ; j  i: (55)
In order to protect the privacy of secure users, we should
maximize the sum rate of common users with the rate thresh-
olds of secure users guaranteed. Thus, the low-power signals of
the secure users can be hidden in the signals of other common
users with higher power. The optimization problem can be
expressed as
max
vi
KX
i=S+1
Rit
s:t: Rjt  rj ; j = 1; 2; :::;K;
KX
i=1
kvik2  Psum and (54);
(56)
where rj represents the threshold of transmission rate for Uj ,
and Psum is the total transmit power. The transmission rate
for Uj can be denoted as
Rjt = log2

1 + min

SINRjb

; b  j: (57)
B. Approximate Transformations
Due to the fact that (56) is non-convex, we need to convert it
into a convex one before solving it. We first introduce auxiliary
variables tw; w = S + 1; S + 2; :::;K. Thus, the optimization
problem (56) can be converted to
max
vi;tw
log2(tS+1tS+2:::tK) (58a)
s:t: 1+minfSINRwa ; SINRwwg  tw; a=1; 2; :::; w  1; (58b)
Rjt  rj ; j = 1; 2; :::;K; (58c)
KX
i=1
kvik2  Psum and (54): (58d)
The logarithmic function in (58a) is non-decreasing, and it
is equivalent to maximize

KQ
w=S+1
tw
 1
K
, which is convex,
increasing, and easy to solve. Thus, the convex problem (58)
can be changed into
max
vi;tw
 
KY
w=S+1
tw
! 1
K
(59a)
s:t:
w 1X
m=1
jhyavmj2+2
jhyavwj2
tw   1 ; (59b)
w = S+1; :::;K; a = 1; :::;w 1;
w 1X
m=1
jhywvmj2 + 2 
jhywvwj2
tw   1 ; (59c)
j 1X
m=1
jhyjvmj2 + 2 
jhyjvj j2
2rj   1 ; j = 1; 2; :::;K; (59d)
KX
i=1
kvik2  Psum and (54): (59e)
We can observe that the objective function (59a) is convex
with tw. However, the constraints are not convex except the
last one. Thus, it needs to be further transformed into a convex
one.
Proposition 3: Define expressions of vw and tw as
F1(vw; tw) =
hyavw2
tw   1 ; w = S + 1; S + 2; :::;K; (60a)
F2(vu) =
hyuvu2
2ru   1 ; u = 1; :::;K: (60b)
The relationship between the above two functions and their
approximate functions at certain points of (vw; tw) and vu
can be denoted as (61a) and (61b), respectively.
F1(vw; tw)  L1(vw; tw; vw; tw); (61a)
F2(vu)  L2(vu; vu): (61b)
The Taylor approximate expansions of the above two functions
at these points can be expressed as
L1(vw; tw; vw; tw) =
2Re
 
hyavwv
y
wha

tw   1
  Re
 
hyavwv
y
wha

(tw   1)2 (tw   1); (62a)
L2(vu; vu)=
2Re
 
hyuvuv
y
uhu
 Re  hyuvuvyuhu
2ru   1 : (62b)
Proof: (60a) is a convex function of vw and tw. Thus,
applying the first order Taylor expansion at (vw; tw), we can
derive
F1 (vw; tw) F1
 
vw; tw

+
@F1
 
vw; tw

@tw
 
tw   tw

+ 2Re
(
@F1
 
vw; tw

@vw
(vw   vw)
)
=
2Re
 
hyavwv
y
wha

tw   1  
Re
 
hyavwv
y
wha

(tw 1)2 (tw 1)
= L1
 
vw; tw; vw; tw

; (63)
7where hyavwv
y
wha can be approximated as Re(h
y
avwv
y
wha), and
hyavwv
y
wha can be approximated as Re(h
y
avwv
y
wha). Similarly,
the first order Taylor expansion of (60b) at vu can be derived
as
F2(vu)  F2(vu) + @F2(vu)
@vu
(vu   vu)
=
2Re
 
hyuvuv
y
uhu
 Re  hyuvuvyuhu
2ru   1 (64)
= L2 (vu; vu) :
Then, we can perform the first-order Taylor approximation
at a specific point on (59). As a result, (59b), (59c), (59d),
and (59e) can be transformed into convex ones. Similarly, the
decoding conditions (54) can be also converted to
Sk=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
hy1v12  :::  minhy1v22 ; :::; hy1vK2 ;
: : : ;hySv12  :::  minhySv22 ; :::; hySvK2 ;hyS+1v12:::minhyS+1v22 ; :::; hyS+1vK2 ;
: : : ;hyKv12  :::  minhyKv22 ; ::: hyKvK2 :
(65)
Therefore, all the restrictions in (59) have been converted to
convex, and the problem can be modified into a SOCP, where
the hyperbolic constraint t2  xy (x  0; y  0) can be
changed into
k[2t; x  y]yk  x+ y: (66)
In addition, (59b), (59c), (59d), and (59e) can also be changed
into SOC constraints, and we can obtain the corresponding
optimization problem in (67) at the top of next page. In (67),
H = dlog2Ke, which denotes a ceiling function.
C. Proposed Algorithm
(67) is a convex SOCP problem, which can be solved itera-
tively via CVX to obtain the solution to the original problem
(56). The iterative algorithm is summarized as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterative algorithm for (56)
1: Randomly generate initial values (v0w; t0w) for (67). Set the
initial number of iterations n = 1.
2: repeat
3: Calculate the optimization value of (67) by the point
(vnw; tnw) .
4: Update the current value of (vn+1w ; tn+1w ) = (v
n
w; t
n
w).
5: Update: n = n+ 1.
6: until n = N .
In Algorithm 1, the SOCP is solved in each iteration, and
only the variables are updated. Thus, in order to derive the
computational complexity, we can estimate the complexity of
the worst case for the SOCP in (67). It is known that the
complexity of the interior-point method for SOCP depends on
the number of constraints, variables and the dimensions of all
the SOC constraints [39]. The total number of constraints in
(67) can be calculated as 0:5K3 0:5K2+4K 2+C1, where
C1 represents the non-negative integer constants generated due
to the equivalent SOC representations of the geometric means
in the objective functions. Thus, the number of iterations to
reduce the duality gap to a constant fraction of itself is upper
bounded by
I = O
p
0:5K3   0:5K2 + 4K   2 + C1 (68)
for (67). Furthermore, the amount of calculation per iteration
can be expressed as
Q=O

(2KM+K 1)2 1:5K3 1:5K2+8K+KM+2C1: (69)
Based on (68) and (69), we can derive the computational
complexity of Algorithm 1 by (70) .
After performing Algorithm 1, the eavesdropping rate to-
wards the secure users can be calculated as
Rie=log
 
1 +
jhevij2PK
m=1;m 6=i jhevmj2 + 2
!
; i=1; : : : ; S; (71)
which is close to 0, due to the fact that the transmit power
of the common users becomes higher to maximize their trans-
mission rate, which can disrupted the eavesdropping towards
the secure users effectively.
Thus, the privacy of the secure users can be guaranteed, and
their secrecy rate can be denoted as
Ris = R
i
t  Rie; i = 1; : : : ; S; (72)
where Rit and R
i
e are given by (57) and (71), respectively.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme for
the single-antenna UAV is first presented. Then, the case for
the multi-antenna UAV with multiple secure users is discussed.
The altitude of the UAV is fixed at 50 m in the simulation.
The pass-loss exponent  is set to 2 and the channel power
gain at the reference distance  is equal to 10 4. The noise
power 2 is set to -110 dBm.
A. Single-Antenna UAV
First, we consider the case of 3 ground users, and one of
them requires secure transmission, i.e., K = 3 and S = 1. The
threshold of transmission rate is set to r = r1 = r2 = r3 =0.5
bit/s/Hz. The locations of the three ground users are (0, 0, 0),
(60, -30, 0) and (110, 40, 0) in meters, respectively. U1 is the
secure user.
To verify the optimal hovering position of the UAV, the
transmission rate and secrecy rate of U1 are compared in Fig.
2 for different locations of the UAV, i.e., above the secure user
(0, 0, 0), above the farthest user (110, 40, 0) and above the
horizontal center of the three users (56.67, 3.33, 0). From the
results, we can see that the transmission rate of U1 with these
UAV positions can all achieve the rate threshold 0.5 bit/s/Hz,
according to the optimization problem (14). For the secrecy
8max
vi;tw
t0 (67a)
s:t: k[2tH 1m ; (tH2m 1   tH2m)]yk  tH2m 1 + tH2m; m = 1; 2; :::2H 1; (67b)
k[2tH 2m ; (tH 12m 1   tH 12m )]yk  tH 12m 1 + tH 12m ; m = 1; 2; :::2H 2; (67c)
:::::: (67d)
k[2t01; (t11   t12)]yk  t11 + t12; m = 1;
k[2hywv1; 2hywv2:::2hywvw; 2; (L1   1)]yk  L1 + 1; w = S + 1; :::K; (67e)
k[2hyuv1; 2hyuv2:::2hyuvu; 2; (L2   1)]yk  L2 + 1; u = 1; :::K; (67f)
k[v1; v2:::vK ]yk 
p
Psum; and (65): (67g)
C = O
p
0:5K3   0:5K2 + 4K   2 + C1 (2KM +K   1)2
 
1:5K3   1:5K2 + 8K +KM + 2C1

: (70)
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Fig. 2. Comparison of transmission rate and secrecy rate of U1 with different
hovering positions of the UAV.
rate of U1, it is close to the transmission rate when the UAV
hovers above U1, due to the fact that its transmit power is the
lowest, and it can be hidden in the high-power signals of other
users. However, when the UAV hovers above the farthest user
or above the horizontal center of the three users, the secrecy
rate becomes lower or even close to 0 according to (71). In
this case, the transmit power for U1 becomes higher when U1
is far from the UAV, and thus, the eavesdropping rate towards
Us tends to be higher.
Then, the sum rate of U2 and U3 is compared in Fig. 3,
with different values of Psum and the threshold r. The UAV
is located at (0, 0, 50). From the results, we can see that
the sum rate of U2 and U3 becomes higher with larger Psum
and lower r. This is because the the lowest transmit power is
allocated to U1 to satisfy its rate threshold r and guarantee its
security, and the remaining power is allocated to U2 and U3 to
maximize their sum rate. Therefore, lower r results in higher
sum rate of U2 and U3 due to higher transmit power allocated
to them. In addition, the eavesdropping rate and secrecy rate
of U1 are compared in Fig. 4, with different values of Psum
and the threshold r. The UAV is located at (0, 0, 50). From
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Psum and the threshold r. M = 5.
the results, we can see that the secrecy rate of U1 is close
to the threshold r, especially when Psum is high and r is
small, which is due to the fact that more transmit power can
be allocated to U2 and U3 to disrupt the eavesdropping towards
U1 in this case. On the other hand, we can also find that the
eavesdropping rate towards U1 is a little higher when Psum
is low and r is large. This is because lower power can be
allocated to U2 and U3 to disrupt the eavesdropping, in order
to achieve higher r for U1.
B. Multi-Antenna UAV
For the multi-antenna UAV, we assume that S = 3 and
K = 5, i.e., 3 out of 5 users are secure users. U1, U2 and U3
are secure users, and U4 and U5 are common users. The five
users are located at (0, 0, 0), (8, -18, 0), (40, 32, 0), (-8, 10,
0) and (15, 25, 0) in meters, while the UAV is at (0, 0, 50).
Thus, the distances between the UAV and these users can be
expressed as d1 < d4 < d2 < d5 < d3.
First, the sum rate of U4 and U5 is compared in Fig. 5, with
different values of Psum and the threshold r. M = 5 antennas
are equipped at the UAV. From the results, we can see that
the sum rate of U4 and U5 increases with higher Psum and
smaller r. This is because when r becomes smaller or Psum
becomes higher, more transmit power can be allocated to the
common users, which makes the small signals of the secure
users hidden in the larger signals of the common users. Thus,
the security of the secure users can be guaranteed. The sum
rate of U4 and U5 is compared in Fig. 6, with different values
of Psum andM . r = 0:5 bit/s/Hz. From the results, we can see
that the sum rate of U4 and U5 increases with Psum and M ,
which is natural due to the fact that more antennas at the UAV
can improve the performance of the beamforming effectively.
Then, the eavesdropping rate towards the secure users is
compared in Fig. 7, with different values of Psum and M .
r = 0:5 bit/s/Hz. From the results, we can observe that
the eavesdropping rate decreases with Psum and M . This
is because more power and antenna resource will make the
proposed more effectively to disrupt the eavesdropping. In
addition, we can also find that the eavesdropping rate of U1
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is lower than that of U2, and the eavesdropping rate of U2 is
lower than that of U3. This is due to the fact that the transmit
power of U1 is the lowest and the transmit power of U3 is
the highest among the three secure users according to NOMA
based on their distances from the UAV, i.e., d1 < d2 < d3.
The secrecy rate of the secure users is compared in Fig. 8,
with different values of Psum and M . r = 0:5 bit/s/Hz. From
the results, we can observe that the secrecy rate of the secure
users increase with Psum and M , due to the fact that more
resource can be utilized in the beamforming to disrupt the
eavesdropping more effectively. Besides, the secrecy rate of
U1 is higher than that of U2, and the secrecy rate of U2 is
higher than that of U3. This is because shorter distance from
the UAV to a specific user will make its transmit power much
lower, and thus, its secure performance becomes better.
Finally, the secrecy rate of the secure users is compared
in the proposed scheme and the conventional scheme in Fig.
9, with different values of Psum. r = 0:5 bit/s/Hz. In the
conventional NOMA scheme, the decoding order is determined
by the distances of the users from the UAV, i.e., 3! 5! 2!
4! 1. From the results, we can observe that the secrecy rate
of U1 in both of these two schemes is almost the same, due to
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M = 5.
the fact that the signal from U1 is last decoded with the lowest
power. However, the secrecy rate of U2 and U3 in the proposed
scheme is much higher than that in the conventional NOMA
scheme. This is because the signals of these two users in the
proposed scheme is decoded later with lower power than those
in the conventional NOMA scheme, which can guarantee their
security effectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed two schemes to enhance
the security of NOMA-UAV networks via PA and beamform-
ing, respectively. First, when only one user requires secure
transmission, the optimal position is derived for the UAV
and the PA problem is performed to maximize the sum
rate of common users with the secure transmission for the
private user guaranteed. However, when several users require
secure transmission simultaneously, it becomes difficult or
even impossible to achieve the secure transmission with a
single antenna at the UAV. Thus, the antenna resource at the
UAV is fully utilized to guarantee the secure transmission of
these users via beamforming optimization. The problem is
non-convex, and we transform it into a SOCP problem, which
can be solved iteratively. Simulation results are presented to
show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in enhancing
the security of NOMA-UAV networks.
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